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The existence of a consensus between labour, capital and government has long been
the focus of attention for those wishing to explain either the relative economic decline
of the British economy or the success of European capitalism since 1945. Whether in
academic or popular accounts, from the political Left or Right the degree to which a
consensus emerged and was regulated remains a central theme.
For Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson ‘connivance between management and unions’
protected old methods of working against more modern techniques with the result that
British industry became characterised by low productivity, low capital investment and a
lack of international competitiveness. Thus the film ‘I’m Alright Jack’ is suggested to
symbolise this low productivity consensus in which a strong shop-stewards
organisation, dominated by a Communist Party member played by Peter Sellers,
colludes with a conservative management to prevent change.1 In contrast Will Hutton’s
influential The State We’re In identified the European model of collaboration and
interdependence between labour, capital and government as the key to the success of
Western European capitalism after 1945.2 Labour’s integration within this consensus
was of such importance that without it the process of convergence, described in the
chapter by Mike Haynes in this volume, whereby economies such as the West German
first caught up and subsequently overtook the British economy would have been in
doubt. Thus for Hutton powerful ‘unions have been important agents in restructuring
German industry, using their dominant position in works councils and their role on
supervisory boards to legitimise often painful programmes of job cuts and wage
reductions.’3
The connection between labour’s self-restraint and capitals commitment to high
investment became the mechanism for high productivity growth. As Hobsbawm, one of
the most influential British socialist historians, points out the growth of the 1950s and
1960s across the industrialised world was a result of a political construct of the Left
and the Right acceptable to all sides. The deal was ‘based upon a tacit or explicit
consensus between employers and labour organisations to keep labour demands within
limits that did not eat into profits, and the future prospects of profits high enough to
justify the huge investments without which the spectacular growth of Golden Age
labour productivity could not have taken place.’4
The explanation for British failure and a comparatively poor post-war productivity
record in this era lies in the inability to fully construct the successful productivity
consensus which Hobsbawm points to. It is not that a consensus failed to emerge,
rather that the consensus within Britain was growth restricting, short-termist and
conservative. Employers and trade unions recognised each other but refused to trust
each other or embrace change, which would deliver long-term benefits. This itself is
explained as a result of a wider failure of the British state to create the mechanisms for
modernisation. Thus for Booth, Melling and Dartmann ‘to explain Britain’s failure,
perhaps the key lies in its liberal and reactive state tradition. An effective productivity
coalition requires a proactive state to persuade, threaten, or coerce institutions
[employers and workers] into a co-operative bargain and to develop the machinery of
co-ordination that consolidates such bargains.’5
The link between labour and economic growth is thus made in a direct, causal
relationship. However, such a direct link is not unproblematic for socialists and indeed
leads many to conclusions which are not dis-similar to those of the Right. It is hardly
surprising that socialist historians should exhibit a predisposition to demonstrating the
importance of the working class to capitalism. A sympathy for working people,
‘rescuing ... from the enormous condescension of posterity’ the anonymous, men and
women who in challenging the rule of capital made history, has been a project for
generations of socialist historians.6 Nevertheless presenting such an approach over-
simplifies the production process within capitalism. All class societies have been based
upon the exploitation of the many by the few. Hence relations of production are
important issues to be addressed. However it is the dynamic of capital accumulation
within capitalism that distinguishes capitalism from other class societies. Individual,
and national, capitalist accumulation derives not simply from the exploitation of a
working class but also inter-capitalist rivalry and competition.7
Explanations of British economic performance based upon the consensus, or
otherwise, between workers and employers assumes exploitation and accumulation are
one and the same thing. Similarly it assumes that once a desirable consensus has been
achieved capital accumulation is somehow automatic. It is the absence of an
understanding of capitalist accumulation that results in the Left adopting a
methodology of contracting and bargaining that also forms the basis of the neo-
classical approach. In particular the role played by markets in allocating resources, the
mechanisms within markets for contracting and the finally the emergence within
markets for sectional interest groups are shared across the political spectrum. To
understand the limitations of adopting these methodologies it is necessary to examine
in more detail the neo-classical approach.
Markets and Workers
Classical economics suggests that all individuals and firms meet in a market and freely
bargain between one another before combining together, in a contract, to exchange the
resources each has to offer.8 So the firm offers wages while the individual offers their
ability to work. In combining together both sides gain, the individual a wage to
purchase goods and the firm labour power to produce goods which can then be sold in
the market place to other individuals or firms. Starting from this simple assumption
economists build elaborate models to explain why one side, or another, in this contract
may not fully fulfil their obligations. Neither side can completely verify the others
honesty prior to entering into the contract. Information is therefore said to be
incomplete and a degree of risk is said to enter into the contract. The firm may not
fully disclose the conditions of work endured while the labour power provided may be
of insufficient intensity to complete the task. In the long-run, explained in economics as
a series of repeated games, both parties to the contracts develop institutions which
attempt to reduce the degree to which the other side can default on their obligations.
So unions, employers organisations and indeed the state mediate contracts. Despite all
the possible complexities introduced to explain the diversity of the real world neo-
classical economics maintains that two fundamental assumptions still hold in this sea of
contracting and bargaining. First the decision to enter into a contract is a freely made
decision by both parties and conversely both sides are equally free to refuse to enter
into the contract and second both sides benefit from the contract, even if the benefit is
not evenly shared.
Among socialists the assumption that workers are free to sell their labour
power in a capitalist market is an obvious fallacy. In the absence of control over the
means of production workers are free to starve rather than free to sell their labour
power. Marx’s expression that workers are in fact ‘wage slaves’ is a more accurate
expression for the position workers find themselves in within a labour market under
capitalism. Labour power is therefore extracted forcibly through exploitation in this
relationship. Indeed neo-classical economics is forced to concede this point but
suggests instead that this exploitation is actually at labour’s request. Bosses are
understood as the ‘residual claimant’ of surpluses once labour and capital have
extracted their share. They are a necessary part of production, whose role is the
monitoring of work to prevent shirking by one section of the labour force relative to
another.9 Shirking and wider opportunistic behaviour is thus introduced as part of
human nature and the creation of coerced labour is understood to emerge as a solution
to the deleterious effects of human nature. Thus Clark maintains that coerced labour
under the factory system arose because workers ‘were not able to discipline
themselves... Whatever the workers themselves thought, they effectively hired the
capitalists to discipline and coerce them.’10 We therefore have the recognition that
labour is not freely given but extracted once contracting is complete.
While the assumption that workers are free to sell their labour power may seem
an obvious fallacy the assumption that this sale is undertaken within a bargaining
environment may seem less so. Within the world of bargaining the demand for labour is
assessed by capital within a market environment. The firm recognises its needs and
according to the supply and quality of labour provided a price, or wage, is said to be
agreed. The market for labour is understood in terms of an open market in which
prices, or wages, are openly traded until the bargaining is complete and contracts are
agreed. Casualised nineteenth and early twentieth century recruitment of dock-workers
might be understood as the archetypal example of such a Walrasian market. Similarly
George Orwell’s account in Down and Out in Paris and London, of the recruitment of
casual sandwich board workers displays this point.
‘We went at five to an alley-way behind some offices, but there was already a queue of
thirty or forty men waiting, and after two hours we were told here was no work for
us… they are engaged by the day, or sometimes for three days, never weekly, so they
have to wait hours for their job every morning.'11
The important point to make about the bargain struck is not simply that labour is wage
slavery and therefore the price is not freely arrived at but still more importantly the
bargain struck is a bargain based upon an unequal access to the means of production.
The firm not only controls the means of production but also, importantly, plays a
specific intermediary role in realising the value created through labour. In other words
workers who refuse to accept wage labour are prevented from establishing themselves
as alternative non-exploitative firms for two reasons.  First access to resources is
removed from the worker. Capitalism’s early development was inextricably linked to
the physical theft of resources through enclosure, clearance and the redefining and
enforcement of private property rights. The victory of market relationships was not
simply an evolutionary victory over common rights and moral economy rather it
involved violent overthrow and revolution.12 For an individual worker to refuse to
enter into a wage labour relationship they must gain exclusive access to the means of
production and in so doing thus become a capitalist.
Second the results of workers labour is removed from them through the use of markets
as a medium for exchange. The results of human labour becomes mere commodities
valued simply in terms of their market price which itself is determined by the
combination of rival capitalist firms ability to produce similar commodities and the
ability to sell these commodities in the market. An understanding of goods value being
related to the labour theory of value has no place in this approach. The position the
capitalist then occupies, as intermediary, in the exchange process ensures they acquire
specialist information unavailable to workers. This intermediary position ensures they
develop the personal contacts, contracts and market information necessary to engage
in trade. Once this is linked to the ownership of the means of production workers'
opportunity to freely bargain is removed. Clear evidence for this can be seen in
industries which required low levels of capital investment and employed workers to
undertake the role of co-ordinating exchange. Within the eighteenth century
transatlantic shipping industry clerks were employed to locate trade opportunities
between ports. Because this trade was irregular and involved establishing personal
contacts, gaining specialist knowledge, it became common place for individual clerks
to leave their employer and establish themselves as independent capitalist merchants
competing with their previous employer. Transatlantic shipping was characterised by
atomistic competition with bills of exchange providing credit for the purchase of goods
and the combining of individuals into partnerships (typically of 64) to fund the voyage
itself. Once the ship returned to port and the goods were sold the bills of exchange
were settled, each partner received their share and the partnership dissolved. This
atomistically competitive market was broken up when trade became regularised by the
1820s. Now transatlantic trade required a fleet of ships and hence large-scale capital
investment, which emerged under the control of the emergent class of professional
shipowners. Commercial information itself also became routinised and easily controlled
by the larger firms involved through the employment of resident agents in distant ports.
Specialist contracting under these conditions became the preserve of the individual
capitalist, or their salaried managers, and competition itself was regulated through
shipping conferences, which fixed rates and tonnage in cartel arrangements. Large
shipping firms, including Cunnard emerged under exactly these circumstances.13
The bargaining process is itself not independent. If wage labour is more accurately
described as ‘wage slavery’ then the bargaining environment is one in which capital
holds a gun to the head of labour during bargaining. Capital and labour come together
in a conflicting relationship based upon exploitation and alienation rather than one
based upon mutuality and consensus. Contracting in this framework is one in which
‘cheating’ is not only endemic rather it is a necessity if either capital or labour is to
realise as much of the surplus as is possible from the results of the labour process.
Sclerotic Decline
Neo-classical writers have adopted the bargaining framework to explain the alleged
failure of the British economy since 1945. Most influentially Mancur Olson’s Rise and
Decline of Nations maintained that societies develop what he termed ‘distributional
coalitions’ over time which essentially usurp surplus through collective action.14 In
Olson’s view distributional coalitions include not simply trade unions and employers
associations but any form of collective group which interferes with free markets
including such groups as the Campaign for Real Ale or even the National Childbirth
Trust! etc. Olson maintained that, in an important phrase, in the absence of ‘defeat in
war, military occupation or revolution’ growth would slow as these interest groups
emerged and grew resulting in what he termed sclerotic decline. For Olson then it is
the liberation of the free market that ensures rapid economic growth. Within the British
context this view, has been taken up by the supply-side reform school such as Bean,
Broadberry & Crafts. They maintain that the economy became characterised by a lack
of commitment and co-ordination such that employers, trade unions and government
all pursued sort-term goals at the expense of encouraging market mechanisms via
supply-side reforms.15 Management failed to grasp new technologies and new
opportunities while trade unions conservatively protected their short-term interests in
jobs and wages against prospects of longer-term economic growth and implicit
prosperity. The solution presented by this supply-side approach was one of freeing up
markets, removing distributional coalitions and introducing wider supply-side reforms.
In so doing free market contracting would resolve commitment problems while the
price mechanism would resolve co-ordination problems.
For the Left the centrality of exploitation rather than accumulation and the adoption of
bargaining and contracting here again leads to similar conclusions, linking institutional
stability with economic stagnation.
While Saville correctly argues that it was only in questioning Britain's great power
status and defence commitments that an alternative economic strategy could have
emerged after 1945 he maintains that it was the continuity of British institutions which
acted to stifle new thinking in foreign policy. As Saville suggests the ‘stability of the
institutional framework at the top level of government worked [to encourage
conservatism]. Alone among the major powers of Europe during the twentieth century,
Britain never experienced either defeat in war or a major upheaval in administrative
organisation.’16 As seen above these distributional coalitions could well unite against
change leading to under-performance with an anti-technological bias. Hence Larry
Elliott and Dan Atkinson ‘connivance between management and unions’ in the
protection of old methods of working during the long boom.
In other areas too these narrow distributional coalitions could lead to under-
performance within the British economy. So for Hutton the mind set of city investors
and pension funds occurs because of the narrow concerns of the financial sector:
‘[the] argument is not that pension funds and insurance companies are
intrinsically short-termist and greedy, bleeding British companies dry by their
demand  for high dividends... [r]ather it is that there is a complex interaction
between the pattern of share ownership, the structure of taxation, the liquidity
of the markets and the framework of company law in which every individual
actor can behave rationally and even decently, but which still produces the
perverse outcome of less investment and output growth than the optimum.’17
The solution for increasing commitment and co-ordination between labour and capital
within these approaches typically lies in the use of government and the state as
independent arbitrator and moderniser in the regulation of private business and labour.
A New Post-war Economic History
Challenging this consensus view of British post-war relative economic decline provides
important insights into explaining the economic history of both reconversion from war
to peace and the long boom.
The uniqueness of the success or failure of reconversion after 1945 has been the centre
of debates over Britain’s post-war economic record. The Attlee government, alone in
Western Europe, is suggested to have allowed for the retrenchment of employer based
sectional distributional coalitions, following the re-introduction of private cartel
agreements and government sponsored trade associations, linked to the continuation of
rationing. Similarly trade unions were allowed to defend over-manning and restrictive
practices due to a resistance to the return of unemployment.18 The failure to introduce
supply-side reforms including stronger competition policy and challenge trade union
influence is said to have had longer-term welfare implications. In contrast those
sympathetic to the Attlee government point to the macro-economic constraints, the
existence of supply-side reform and government concern for productivity through the
introduction of the Anglo-American Council of Productivity and support for
modernisation from within the trade union movement.19 The Attlee government is
suggested to have proved highly successful operating as it was against a very difficult
background.20
In contrast to these two views it is possible to suggest that the Attlee government far
from being unique to those of Western Europe showed greater similarities than
differences. The history of all early post-war Western Europe was one of stabilising
conditions for capitalist development.  It was not one of freeing up markets and the
break-up of distributional coalitions, instead it is one of consolidation of employers
organisations and agreements over competition in order to establish stability in the face
of fear from domestic social unrest and by 1947 concerns over an emerging cold-war.
At the heart of the Attlee government’s concern to create economic stability was the
necessity of restraining domestic consumption. Rationing not only continued after the
war but was extended to foodstuffs, including bread and potatoes in 1946 and 1947
respectively.21 While Cairncross, a writer sympathetic to the Attlee government’s
economic record, disputes the importance of the continuation of rationing even he
admits that calorific intake remained below its pre-war level until 1950.22 Economic
policy was summed up under the phrase ‘export or die’. Domestic consumption and
living standards were held down in order to resolve the crisis derived from sterling
balances held abroad. The British economy was financially bankrupt and only avoided
crisis due to dollar loans from America and Canada and restrictions placed on Empire
countries preventing exchange of sterling for dollars. Indeed it is Cairncross’s
contention that the most significant economic legacy was the holding down of living
standards between 1945 and 1951. When decontrol was introduced into the economy
it came to private industry first and consumers last, with food rationing finally
abolished in 1954. In other areas too the Attlee government proved favourable to
capital rather than labour. The nationalisation programme was not only understood by
contemporaries as largely ‘inevitable’ but was also carried out with compensation of
£2.6b, resulting in a series of capital injections into the private sector for further
investment.23 This compensation was paid out at a time when the British government’s
central difficulty in reconversion was an acknowledged shortage of finance.
Compensation for nationalisation far exceeded the American loan, negotiated by
Keynes prior to his death, which imposed the conditions of accepting Bretton Woods
and convertibility on Britain and was the origin of the establishment of a U.S.
hegemony over Western Europe after 1945. By contrast the government took a much
tougher line with trade unionists, using troops to break strikes on 18 occasions,
introducing two States of Emergency and reviving the Supply and Transport
Organisation whose origin lay in the breaking of the 1926 General Strike.24
Government was also prepared to use legal prosecution of strike leaders and engage in
anti-Communist witch-hunting of communists within the trade union movement in
order to control the labour movement.25
A similar pattern of development can be seen across Europe at this time.
Nationalisation programmes of industries from banking to railways, often requiring
large scale capital investment and integration for national development can be seen
throughout Europe. While neo-classical writers have pointed to de-nazification and
deconcentration of West German industry as an example of removing distributional
coalitions from business, they have failed to notice the abandonment of this project by
1947. In the face of an emerging cold-war allied policy switched from preventing
economic recovery to ensuring West German economic development lay at the heart of
plans for a prosperous Europe.26 Creating economic stability required government
intervention and nationalisation along with support for private business in the
reconstruction of agreements and cartels limiting competition. Western European
governments also sought to limit the impact of communist movements with Marshall
Aid explicitly linked to the removal of communist influence within government,
particularly in Italy.
Western European recovery from the Second World War was, as Milward has noted, a
political rescue of the nation state in which the rescue of one was inter-dependant upon
the rescue of all.27 European integration became a political rather than simply an
economic project in which all economies followed a relatively similar pattern.
The Long Boom
While the importance of the similarities between Britain and other Western European
economies in the years of reconversion might be disputed most accept that in the long
boom that followed Britain, albeit less successfully, adopted the same consensus based
pattern of economic development which emerged throughout West European
capitalism. How then are we to explain the long-term relative decline of the British
economy from 1951-73?
Here, by contrast with mainstream keynesian and neo-classical approaches, the
important features of the British experience are not the similarities with Western
Europe but the differences. First, Britain still retained a unique legacy deriving from
the fact that its economy was on the frontier of capitalist development at the turn of
the Twientieth Century. Unlike all other nations it was unable to develop utilising the
advantages of combined and uneven development and instead was tied to a range of
technologies, which were suited to a world of trade and development, distinguished by
early industrialisation. British capitalism was characterised by export led heavy
industries of the first industrial revolution. Industrial restructuring out of the natural
textiles, coal, shipbuilding and iron and steel industries and into those of the second
industrial revolution such as artificial fibres, electrical engineering, cars and alloy
metals was always going to be a slow and painful process.28 The economy’s long-term
relative decline therefore derives from its early head-start as the first industrial nation
and for the most part requires no explanation.29
After 1945 however there are two further factors which influenced British capitalism’s
development. First, Britain’s legacy of Empire with its consequent importance as an
orientation for British trade, combined with Britain’s failure to recognise the
importance of the emerging European market have been widely recognised. It was not
simply that British firms focused upon slower growing markets but that firms were not
subject to the same competitive pressures. British exports remained in commodity
sectors of decreasing importance to importing economies. As late as the 1950s the
three largest commodity groups exported were non-electrical machinery, transport
equipment and textiles.30 From the mid 1950s as cartels gave way to mergers and
rationalisation across Europe British capitalism failed to invest in the industries offering
new opportunities in wider consumer mass markets. So firms such as General Electric
Company abandoned consumer markets in television production in favour of prospects
of safer returns from nuclear energy and armaments. In the car industry it is hardly
surprising that BLMC (what became the nationalised company British Leyland in
1975) needed rescuing after almost 95% of its declared net profits between 1968 and
1974 were paid out as dividend payments to shareholders.31
Finally, this brings us to the second important and neglected aspect of this relative
decline; the permanent arms economy.32 To explain why British capitalism failed to
recognise the importance of European markets and failed to recognise the importance
of mass markets in consumer goods we need to understand that the British ruling class
still accepted its role as a world power.33 Although clearly subordinate to American
capitalism by 1945 it still played a central role in creating and sustaining a pro-western
hegemony in the Cold-War that followed. In accepting this role military expenditure
inevitably had a major impact on domestic economic development. Of the major
western economies only the United States spent more on defence, as a proportion of
GDP, than Britain after 1945.34 Although defence expenditure in Britain peaked in
1952, following the outbreak of the Korean War, and declined continually in real terms
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Britain remained a high spending nation. By 1962,
ten years after real expenditure peaked, military orders accounted for around 70 per
cent of the aircraft industry’s output, 22 per cent of the electronics industry (including
at least 35 per cent from the industrial and radio communications sectors) and 23 per
cent of shipbuilding.35
The inter-relation between the importance of public expenditure and the growth of the
defence sector has led Edgerton to suggest that the post-war political consensus which
emerged after 1945 was constructed around an industrial/military nexus based upon
high technology and high defence expenditure.36 Elsewhere, Freeman maintains that
government research and development funding required a ’considerable reorientation’
away from military and prestige projects in order to establish a framework conducive
to establishing more competitive industries.37 However, in general the impact of arms
expenditure on the British economy and the stabilising effect on world capitalism of a
permanent arms economy has largely been ignored among mainstream historians and
economists.
Conclusion
The existence of a consensus between labour and capital lies at the heart of the most
influential Left wing writing on post-war economic growth. The importance and
weakness of this consensus is also understood to be central to explanations of rapid
economic growth throughout Western Europe and British relative economic decline
respectively. The existence, importance and weakness of this consensus is also shared
by those of the Right.
This chapter has maintained that to explain the relative failure of the British economy
after 1945 on a cosy deal between workers, employers and government is flawed on
two counts. First there is a systematic failure to recognise the role played by
accumulation, rather than exploitation, as the dynamic of capitalist development. This
itself may be due to the project of the Left being reform within the existing economic
order as opposed to revolutionary change. A challenge to the particular form
exploitation takes can be accommodated as long as the prospect is future dynamic
growth, under the existing conditions for capital accumulation, is maintained.
However, a challenge to the process of capitalist accumulation itself leads inevitably to
the presentation of an alternative method of economic development. For socialists
economic growth itself is a prospect offering hope and liberation for the mass of the
world’s population, yet how can sustained, planned and crisis free economic growth be
achieved without a revolutionary challenge to the mechanisms of capitalist
accumulation? Inevitably an analysis of post-war economic growth which places
questions of accumulation at the heart of its explanation leads to a view which
recognises the need for revolutionary change.
The second reason for rejecting the consensus hypothesis lies in the fact that the
historical record brings the very existence of a consensus into question.  To
demonstrate a consensus requires ignoring key aspects of the historical evidence. The
Attlee government becomes a one sided monolith, depending upon the Left or Right
view of the consensus hypothesis that is accepted. Either the Attlee government
adopted modernising polices under difficult international circumstances and opposition
from a domestic employing class, which was highly politised. In which case the degree
to which the Attlee government appeased employer opposition is under emphasised
and the government’s deeply hostile response to independent working class action is
ignored entirely. Or alternatively, the Attlee government entrenched a conservative
tripartism which prevented the market pressure supply-side reform would have
brought, in which case the ready acceptance of reform and attempted modernisation is
equally under emphasised while again government’s hostility exhibited to independent
working class activity is again ignored.
The historical record demonstrates a very different relationship existed between the
Attlee government labour and capital. It sought to re-establish a stability and economic
relationships that the depression had fractured and the Second World War tore apart.
As Milward recognised the nation state required rescuing after 1945.38 This was a
rescue both from itself in reducing the tendency towards war inherent within capitalist
accumulation and a rescue from alternatives to capitalist development deriving from
the opposition of the working class to a return to the 1930s.
The importance of an analysis rooted in capitalist accumulation goes further than
providing an alternative view of the Attlee government. It also provides a unifying
theory of the long boom and its subsequent collapse through the recognition played by
the permanent arms economy. The long boom was indeed predicated upon a tacit
consensus but one based upon cold-war imperialism and its resultant high arms
expenditure.
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